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Self-Defense: Tell Me Moore
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan*

Michael Moore is a master architect in criminal law theory. Each piece of his theorizing neatly
and completely coheres with others. Moore’s views are often so clear and well argued that if one
spends enough time with Moore’s work, one can generally predict his answers to any question. Every
brick has its place. And there’s more. Moore also has a thoroughly worked out shtick for explaining his
theories. Moore’s writings are replete with citations to movies, songs, and even Sunday comics,
including The Princess Bride,1 Blondie,2 and The Sound of Music.3 Indeed, sometimes it seems that
reading Moore’s work is an exercise in bad popular culture references.
One of the most predictable of Moore’s references is when he needs to talk about self-defense.
In the movie, History of the World Part I, Moses drops one of the tablets, leaving ten instead of fifteen
commandments. That third tablet, argues Moore, included exceptions to deontological norms such as
the exception for self-defense.4 It’s Moore’s clever way of asserting that even deontology does not
really mean “thou shalt not kill” full stop.
Like Moses’ third tablet, Moore’s work likewise seems to have dropped self-defense. It is almost
an afterthought in his theorizing about the relationship between deontology and consequentialism.
Placing Blame contains a handful of pages.5 Self-defense gets two pages in Causation and
Responsibility.6 Even when he discusses targeted killings in Targeted Killings and the Morality of Hard
Choices, Moore quickly moves beyond a self-defense justification.7
Self-defense fascinates me, and I have questions for Moore. I just wish that he would say more
about the positions that he holds. More troubling, I worry that the sparse commitments he has may be
difficult to square with some of his other criminal law positions. Putting the pieces together of that
broken tablet may ultimately yield that Moore’s architecture is left askew.
In what follows, I will first give a brief overview of the current theorizing about self-defense.
Next, I will set forth Moore’s arguments about when self-defense is justified and why. Finally, I will raise
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a series of questions, both about the content of Moore’s view and its implications for other positions he
holds.
I.

Self-Defense Theorizing: The State of the Art in a Nutshell

When one endeavors to give an account of “self-defense,” the initial question is what one
means by “self-defense.” As a matter of ordinary language, our use of the term is quite extensive. If a
culpable aggressor tries to kill me and I kill him, I will justify my action by claiming “self-defense.” The
term can also be applied to the killing of an innocent aggressor, that is, a person who lacks culpability
but whose act will kill me, such as a child who mistakenly believes a real gun to be a toy. And, we can
certainly say that one acts in self-defense when one kills an innocent threat, an individual who does not
even voluntarily act but whose body nevertheless threatens me, such as the large man who will fall on
me and kill me if I do not disintegrate him immediately.8 Indeed, “self-defense” would likewise be an
explanation for why I shot a rabid dog that was about to attack me or maybe even why I disintegrated
your television set that was about to smash into me during a tornado.
Given that all instances of self-defense are “defensive” in nature, it is tempting to think that
there must be a unifying explanation. I think we ought to resist that temptation. Because we can
meaningfully employ the term “self-defense” to justify our killing of a culpable aggressor or destroying a
neighbor’s television, the explanation would likely have to be so broad as to run roughshod over
relevant moral nuances. It is thus more fruitful to think of self-defense as a type of defense, where
some tokens may be permissible (or justified) and others will not. 9
One of the most important normative and conceptual moves in the self-defense literature in the
last decade or so has been to carve out liability as a distinct route to permissibility.10 Previously, it
seemed that one must opt to either take an “aggressor-centered” approach or a “defender-centered”
perspective. The assumption was that we needed to pick which approach should govern self-defense.
However, this assumption is false. One may believe that both perspectives are morally relevant. A
liability approach focuses on what an aggressor must do to be liable to defensive force, that is, to have
forfeited his right against being defensively harmed. A permission-based view focuses on when a
defender may harm a person who is, or is perceived to be, an attacker. It is coherent to say that an
individual is liable to be killed but it is impermissible for the defender to do so, and it is also coherent to
claim that an agent may permissibly kill someone who is not liable to be killed.
As one brief example of this severance, consider the well-known trolley problem. It is generally
assumed that one may turn the runaway trolley away from five trapped workers to one trapped worker.
Many theorists maintain that the one worker’s rights will be infringed, but not violated, because the
8

These cases were originally imagined by Robert Nozick. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York:
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Law & Phil. 245 (2010).
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action is justified. Notably, the worker has certainly done nothing to lose his right to life. The worker is
not liable to be killed. Contrast this with a culpable aggressor where we would say that the attacker’s
rights are neither infringed nor violated. His own actions have forfeited his moral complaint against
being killed defensively.
Allowing liability to serve as a route to permissibility opens up various possibilities. For instance,
one may maintain that (1) the moral basis for liability to defensive killing is intending a culpable attack
or so appearing; (2) a moral permission to kill another may be based on the agent-relative permission to
give one’s life greater weight; and that (3) as a matter of the usage of the term, “self-defense,” it may be
appropriate to call actions under either (1) or (2) (or both), instances of “self-defense.” This means that
not only do you get to kill bad guys who are trying to kill you for the reason that they have forfeited
their rights but you also get to kill an innocent aggressor (at least sometimes) because you are entitled
to give your life more weight.
To this point we have seen that the term “self-defense” is quite promiscuous and that different
justifications may ground different routes to permissible self-defense. Let us now turn directly to
liability accounts. Liability accounts hold that what the aggressor does grounds why he has forfeited his
rights against defensive force being employed to stop him. Elsewhere, I have defended the following
disjunctive conditions for liability to defensive killing:11
(1a)
The aggressor forms an intention to purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly kill the
defender, the aggressor lacks a justification or excuse, and the aggressor will kill the defender
unless defensive force is used, or
(1b)
The aggressor purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly engages in conduct that he is aware
may lead the defender to believe that that (1a) is true, and the aggressor lacks a justification or
excuse for so doing; AND
(2)
Based on his belief that he is subject to attack, the defender acts to repel the perceived
attack.
That is, I argue that culpable attackers who will kill their victims are liable to defensive force by the
defender. I have defended the position that this (1a) forfeiture is a fitting and appropriate response to a
culpable attack by the aggressor. If the aggressor were permitted to attack, thus ignoring the rights of
others while maintaining his own rights, it would be fundamentally unfair.12 The grounding of the
forfeiture for (1b) is distinct. For this sort of forfeiture, I maintain that when we insincerely evince the
exercise of a normative power or a change in normative relations, that power is exercised or those
relations are truly altered, or so I have argued.13 This forfeiture by insincere act is fitting and
appropriate because the faker would otherwise make the interpreter normatively vulnerable. The
11
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interpreter no longer knows what rights and duties he has. The idea is that if someone points an
unloaded gun at you but makes you believe the gun is loaded, you mistakenly believe that he has
forfeited his rights. Because he is the one who has culpably created this belief, he forfeits his rights such
that he is not wronged by your using the force you believe is necessary to defend yourself.
Other self-defense theorists offer disparate views. To take two other views in the literature, Jeff
McMahan grounds forfeiture in moral responsibility, which is best understood as unjustified,
foreseeable risk imposition.14 Jonathan Quong grounds forfeiture in the failure to attribute to someone
his full moral status.15 We can contrast the claims by considering the following three cases.
Falling Large Man.16 Victor falls to the bottom of a well. His arch-enemy, Abe, sees this. When
Tony, a very large man, walks by, Abe pushes Tony down the well. If Tony lands on Victor, Victor
will die but Tony will live. Victor has in his possession a ray gun with which he can disintegrate
Tony.
Conscientious Driver.17 Darla is driving her well maintained car down the road. Suddenly, her
car malfunctions such that it veers toward Peter, a pedestrian. If Darla hits Peter, he will die.
Peter can throw a grenade at Darla’s car such that it will blow up and kill only her.
The Resident.18 An identical twin of a vicious killer is driving down the road when his car
malfunctions. He is nonculpably unaware of the fact that his brother has escaped from prison
and local news channels have warned residents to be on the lookout. Moreover, his evil twin
has a modus operandi of knocking on the door to a home and then immediately killing the
occupant. The innocent twin knocks on the Resident’s door. She believes he is his evil twin
brother; she raises her pistol to shoot him (that she just happens to be holding). The innocent
twin sees what the Resident is about to do. (To be clear, in The Resident, the question is
whether the Resident is liable to be killed because she mistakenly believes the innocent twin to
be the evil one and acts on that mistaken belief.)
Falling Large Man is commonly viewed as an instance of an innocent threat because the fact
that he is threatening Victor with harm is not attributable to a voluntary act.19 Conscientious Driver and
The Resident are innocent aggressors because they have acted voluntarily but have not culpably chosen
to attack.

14

Jeff McMahan, “The Basis of Moral Liability to Defensive Killing,” 15 Phil. Issues 386 (2005).
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I have defended the claim that none of these actors is liable to be killed as none of them are
culpable.20 (I do maintain that with respect to non-culpable attackers, it is plausible that one has an
agent-relative permission to give one’s own life greater weight vis-à-vis innocent aggressors.21) In
contrast, Jeff McMahan claims that anyone who (1) will in fact cause an unjustified harm (as is true in
each of these cases because in each case, from an omniscient point of view, none of these actors is
behaving justifiably) and (2) has engaged in foreseeable nonreciprocal risk imposition (as is true in the
latter two cases because in those two cases the innocent aggressors know they are engaging in behavior
that creates a risk of harming an innocent – the driver chooses to drive and the resident chooses to
shoot) is liable because the aggressor is morally responsible.22 Jonathan Quong argues that only the
Resident is liable because she makes a mistake as to the twin’s liability (she believes he is attacking her
and has forfeited a right when in fact he has not) and it is the failure to accord someone his full moral
status that makes the aggressor liable.23 In contrast, according to Quong, because the Conscientious
Driver’s risk calculation already takes into account the value of both his life and that of the pedestrian
(the determination that it is safe to drive conscientiously already includes in the calculation, and gives
due value to, the possibility of harming a pedestrian), the driver is not liable. Neither Quong nor
McMahan maintains that the Falling Large Man is liable as he has not chosen to impose any risk at all.
Beyond liability itself, theorists must address proportionality and necessity. Consider
proportionality first. Most theorists agree that the harm employed defensively must be in proportion to
the harm threatened.24 One way to understand this is that the aggressor only forfeits rights against a
certain amount of force. Anything beyond that amount is a harm that would violate his rights.
Proportionality then is typically seen as internal to liability.25
There is more significant debate over the question of necessity. Jeff McMahan, for example,
crafts liability in such a way that it entails necessity. An aggressor is only liable to harm if it is necessary
to harm him to protect oneself.26 The reason that one acts, then, is built into the liability/forfeiture
condition. In contrast, one might claim that the loss of a right is independent of the reason to harm the
aggressor. The attack forfeits rights, and the attack provides a reason to harm the aggressor, but these
20
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two can come apart: if, for example, the culpable attacker is only bluffing – his attack forfeits his right
without providing a reason to harm him.27 Both views still require that the defender believe force is
necessary, either because the intention is relevant to permissibility or because the rights forfeiture is
nuanced so that rights are only forfeited vis-à-vis actors who believe the harm they are inflicting will
prevent the attack.28
A final consideration for liability accounts is the possibility of more than one aggressor or threat.
What if, instead of a large man, Abe goes to the nearby hospital, takes 50 newborn babies, ties them
together with twine, and hurls the bawl of babies at Victor? What if, instead of one Conscientious
Driver, Peter, the pedestrian, must kill fifteen individuals who have chosen to drive their cars?
I suspect that most people would think that it is wrong to kill the fifty babies or fifteen
nonculpable drivers. This gives us reason to reject the view that these threats/aggressors are liable to
be killed. This intuition is likely even stronger when we appeal to the question of what third parties
should do. Why would a third party have to pick Victor over fifty babies? What is the argument for
that?
Some theorists, who are sympathetic to the claim that innocent aggressors can be liable to
defensive force, have offered alternative accounts for what to do when these “minimally responsible
threats” are aggregated. McMahan and Saba Bazargan advocate hybrid justifications that contain
elements of liability and elements of a lesser-evils justification.29 The idea is that a conscientious driver
may be partially liable. The reason it is permissible to kill him, then, is because he counts as less of a
person when weighed against the pedestrian. Because this is a lesser-evils balancing, continuing to
increase the number of conscientious drivers ultimately leads to a point at which the pedestrian may no
longer kill the conscientious drivers because their deaths are no longer the lesser evil. To be sure,
increasing the number of aggressors raises puzzles for those who take innocent aggressors to be liable.
Although these are clearly divergent views and this is a superficial overview, even now, we can
see that these views share certain core assumptions. The first is that individuals can forfeit rights by
what they do, and that one can provide a principled account of why the individual is responsible in such
a way that it is fitting and appropriate for his rights to be forfeited. The second is that this forfeiture can
be nuanced. It is not an assumption that we get to boil aggressors in oil for kicks. It is an assumption
that for so long as you are a threat, you cannot complain if someone stops you. Thus, though selfdefense theorists might quibble over the grounds for rights-forfeiture, we share certain assumptions
about what such a theory needs and what such a theory does.

27
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I cannot possibly do justice to the complexity of the arguments in the self-defense scholarship.
If anyone could master the mechanics, it would be Michael Moore. Any subject matter is the better for
Moore’s engagement with it. Where, then, should we situate Moore’s views on defensive force?

II.

Moore on Self-Defense

Moore typically substantially and thoroughly analyzes topics within criminal law. Unfortunately,
he has spent less of his career grappling with self-defense. If I had to diagnose the cause of this lack of
attention, it would not be that Moore is reluctant to confront a challenge. Quite the contrary. I suspect
he thinks self-defense is easy. Hopefully, I can convince him that this is not so.
Moore’s most recent articulation of his position is in Targeted Killings and the Morality of Hard
Choices.30 He begins with the claim that we have a “strong permission” to engage in self-defense such
that we are permitted to defend ourselves even if the consequentialist balance tips otherwise.31
Following Phillip Montague, he takes self-defense to be an instance of a “general moral principle”: “he
who culpably causes the necessity of some harm being visited on somebody, is himself the right person
to be made to suffer such harm.”32 This principle is supported by “robust intuitions of fairness and
appropriateness.”33 There is a “divine justice” when the bad guy gets the harm he had intended for the
innocent victim.34
Moore then turns to innocent aggressors and threats. In 2009, in Causation and Responsibility,
Moore was tentative about his conclusion that one is justified in killing two innocent threats.35 In
Targeted Killings, Moore no longer finds the question hard. He admits the question is “a close one” but
concludes that one is justified in killing innocent aggressors and threats, seemingly no matter how
numerous.36 Ball o’ babies beware!
Moore rejects victim-based accounts that culpable actors may forfeit their rights, thus creating a
weak permission that is then open to consequentialist balancing.37 He thus reaffirms a position he set
forth in Placing Blame. In his earlier discussion, Moore maintains that forfeiture accounts cannot supply
a reason why innocent aggressors forfeit their rights nor can they provide an explanation for why when
an attack is over, the aggressor regains his rights.38
In sum, Moore offers a distributive justice account of self-defense, wherein harm ought to fall
upon its culpable cause. He maintains this account is a strong permission, immune to consequentialist
30
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balancing. He believes this permission also applies to Falling Large Man, Conscientious Driver, and The
Resident, and he maintains that this position holds even when the innocent aggressors outnumber the
defenders. Finally, he rejects forfeiture accounts as implausible.
In what follows, I wish to question these claims. First, it is unclear what grounds Moore’s
extension from the redistribution of harm to its culpable cause, to the redistribution of harm to its
innocent cause. Moreover, I am unsure why a causal account would necessarily yield that defenders get
to kill innocent threats; I would think that for Moore this would be empirically contingent on the degree
of causal contribution. Second, I worry that self-defense is not best understood as a mechanism of
distributive justice as it ignores the aggressor’s ability to stop attacking thereby preventing the need for
anyone to be harmed. Third, I query whether Moore’s dismissal of forfeiture is warranted, both because
forfeiture views rely on changes of normative relations, which in other contexts Moore takes to be quite
possible, and because the sort of underlying moral justification at work in Moore’s theory seems in
harmony with the claims made by forfeiture theorists. Finally, I question whether Moore’s theory of
self-defense might justify a deterrence-based criminal law. Indeed, I wonder whether he might be
committed to punishing the innocent.
III.

What Grounds Killing Innocent Aggressors?

The first puzzle is how Moore grounds the extension of “divine justice” from culpable aggressors
to innocent threats. He asserts that for culpable aggressors, the reason why it is justifiable to kill them is
that (1) culpable actors who (2) cause (3) the need for someone to be harmed are the ones who should
therefore be harmed. This is grounded in robust intuitions of fairness that bad guys get their due. He
then goes on to say that defenders can kill innocent threats as well.
I don’t get it. Nothing about the fittingness and appropriateness of culpable actors being
harmed defensively seems to commit us to any particular view of innocent actors. With respect to
innocent aggressors, Moore abandons requirement (1). He never fully articulates an argument for why
it is permissible to kill Falling Large Man, Conscientious Driver, or The Resident.
Without culpability, Moore is left with only causation and necessity. Perhaps Moore thinks that
is enough.39 However, as Coase has shown, causation is reciprocal.40 The only reason the large man
falling down the well is a threat to the defender at the bottom is because the defender found himself at
the bottom of a well. Aren’t they both causes?
Indeed, Moore believes that causation is scalar. Is it not possible then that there will be cases in
which the defender is more of the cause than the innocent threat? After all, we imagine in these cases
that Victor, the person at the bottom of the well, is somehow motivating Abe, the pusher, to try to kill
him. When Abe grabs the large man (who may just be on his way to the post office), why should we

39
40
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R.H. Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,” 3 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1960).

8

assume that the large man is more of a cause of the predicament than the defender? Causation does
not seem to be able to discriminate between innocent aggressor and defender as Moore would have it.
If not culpability (or causation), then what makes this fitting? It is hard to see this account as an
account of distributive justice. Should it not matter what the probability of being victim and defender
are? If we are interested in “fairness and appropriateness,” it seems the calculation should be sensitive
to whether one is more likely to be victim or defender. As Larry Alexander has argued, if it is much less
likely that you will kill someone as an innocent aggressor than that you will become an innocent
aggressor and be killed, perhaps we should not so easily decide that killing innocent aggressors is
permissible.41
There does not seem to be a moral principle that can be added to do the normative work.
Besides the fact that, as Jimbo on South Park would say,42 “they’re coming right for us!” there does not
seem to be any normative grounding that would undergird killing for such a reason. At one point,
Moore seems to indicate that “he’s coming right for us” is a moral ownership. It is about “risk
ownership.” However, Moore has the ownership of the risk argument exactly backwards. Consider
what Moore says about innocent shields. He imagines the following case:
Consider the situation in which a terrorist (‘T’) takes an innocent bystander (‘V’) as a shield to
use as T seeks to kill another (‘D’). If D’s only way to defend himself against T is to shoot
through V, it is common to suppose, morally and legally, that he may do so. The reason for this,
I would think, lies in the ‘ownership’ of the risk (of T’s violence) that V, through no fault of his
own, has acquired. T’s taking V as a shield was V’s misfortune; V did nothing to deserve it but
it’s his nonetheless, like disease or natural catastrophe. D is entitled to resist the shifting of that
risk from V to himself, not because V caused the risk, but because it’s his risk nonetheless.43
Why can it not be equally maintained that the person stuck owning the risk is D? As it stands, V’s being
strapped to T creates no risk to V whatsoever. The unlucky person is D. So why is it that D gets to shift
the risk to V? And why isn’t T entitled to resist the shifting of the risk? If “shit happens”44 to the
innocent who are then stuck with their misfortunes, it isn’t remotely clear why the person who is stuck
is V and not D.
Compare Jeff McMahan’s dismissal of this kind of reasoning in the falling man cases:
It is, however, not the falling man who has bad luck. If no one does anything, he will not be
harmed, for there is a cushion below him. It is that cushion, an immobilized person, who has
bad luck. May he transfer that bad luck to an innocent person, the falling man, by killing him?
41
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To override the presumption against killing, there must be a basis of liability. That basis is
lacking in this case, just as it is when a person can save himself only by killing an innocent
bystander.45
It seems that Moore has yet to come up with an argument that would decisively yield that defenders
may kill innocent threats.46
I wonder what Moore believes he would lose by abandoning the strong permission approach in
favor of an agent-relative permission to kill innocent aggressors. Moore’s view on innocent aggressors is
not in accord with that of Phillip Montague, upon whom Moore claims to be relying. In Self-Defence and
Innocence: Aggressors and Active Threats, Montague distinguishes between culpable and innocent
aggressors.47 Montague does not maintain that we have a claim right to kill innocent aggressors,
holding instead that one has a liberty with which third parties may interfere. This claim is in stark
contrast with Moore’s robust position that self-defense against innocent aggressors is a strong
permission.
Moore has been sympathetic to agent-relative obligations in other work. He notes, for example,
that if an evil threatener threatens to kill a parent’s child unless the parent produces some greater evil,
the parent is justified because the parent has an agent-relative obligation to safeguard her child.48 As
mentioned earlier, some theorists do maintain that one has an agent-relative permission to give one’s
own life greater weight. Moore goes farther in other work, arguing that one has an agent-relative
obligation to safeguard one’s child. I wonder why Moore resists the agent-relative route. There must
be something more at work for Moore that allows defenders to kill many innocent people. I wish he
would, as the Pink Ladies and the T-Birds request, “tell me more.”

IV.

Is It Most Perspicuous to See Self-defense as Mechanism for the Distribution of Inevitable
Harm?

More generally, I doubt that seeing self-defense as a mechanism for the distribution of
inevitable harm is the most perspicuous way to see it.49 As David Wasserman points out, unlike true
distributive questions (in which someone’s gotta die), in self-defense cases, no one has to die.50 The
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culpable aggressor could just change his mind, and he certainly has it within his power to eliminate the
existence of any distributive problem.
Indeed, Montague’s solution to this problem is one Moore would most certainly reject.
Montague makes the necessity dependent on the agent’s perspective. After assuming that Alice is
attacking Al, and Arliss is a third party who can intervene, Montague says of Al and Arliss: “They are
respectively permitted and required to do so as a matter of justice in the distribution of harms that are
unavoidable from their standpoints.”51 To Moore, justice isn’t a matter of perspective. Moore would
thus need to take the position that because it is necessary in fact (because the culpable aggressor will
pull the trigger), the defender may act now to distribute a harm. But taking this approach seemingly
ignores that self-defense is preemptive and there is something important about the fact that the
culpable aggressor can still prevent the creation of any harm.
Moreover, as Wasserman also notes, once the harm is already out there and we are truly
distributing it (for instance, the culpable aggressor has already sunk the ship and everyone is scrambling
for planks), then lots of factors may count.52 Provocateurs nicely raise this. Assume that Iago provokes
Othello into trying to kill Desdemona, but this is a modern version where Othello sets up a machine gun
to fire where Desdemona is sleeping. Iago and Othello are both waiting in the wings. All that you, a
third party, can do is to push either Iago or Othello into the line of fire. Who gets the bullet? And, now,
add another character in the wings -- Claudius, who, from another play, is already responsible for at
least one death. He is a bad guy who has not gotten the punishment he deserves. How do we factor
him into the mix if we are distributing this harm? There are degrees of culpability, degrees of causal
responsibility, and degrees of moral desert and who takes the bullet might just be complicated.53 I
certainly do not disagree that in this sort of case, one must distribute the certain harm. I merely think
that such distributions are complex beyond Moore’s simple justice. At most it seems that a distributive
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justice account may explain some instances of self-defense some of the time.54 That’s fine in the sense
that we need not have only one account. However, Moore must then concede that more work must be
done to cover other cases.
V.

Why Isn’t Moore a Fan of Forfeiture?
Moore dismisses forfeiture theories as implausible. I demur. Moore needs forfeiture.

It may be that Moore dismisses the “full surrender” robust forfeiture that we think of with
respect to some legal rights. Here, he is surely right. If you give something up for ever and ever, well,
then you don’t get it back just by lowering your gun. I take the real objection here to be, not that these
things are restored, but rather, whether this “now you have it, now you don’t, now you have it again”
process is best viewed as one of forfeiture. As Richard Lippke argues in the punishment context,
“Offenders might be understood to suffer other losses with regard to their rights besides forfeiture.
Specifically, their rights might be curtailed or suspended, instead of forfeited. Forfeiture theorists need
to show forfeiture, rather than curtailment or suspension, is the best characterization of the losses that
are justifiably imposed on offenders.”55
Elsewhere I have speculated that because forfeiture seems so final, the literature has gravitated
toward “liability.” However, because “liability” in the self-defense literature is neither legal liability nor
Hohfeldian liability, I am skeptical that this terminological shift was actually for the better.
Nevertheless, even if the objection goes beyond nomenclature to a claim that there is something deeper
at stake with respect to getting the shift in normative relations right, that still does not mean that
offhanded dismissal of forfeiture is warranted. Rather, what liability theorists claim is that there is a
shift in the aggressor’s rights.
Certainly, there is nothing odd about thinking that we can shift our rights and others’ duties. I
can change my moral relationship with you by giving you permission to drive my car. I can obligate
myself through making a promise. I can give you a new reason for acting by making a request. Why isn’t
it plausible that self-defense likewise involves such a shifting of moral relations?
Indeed, as a retributivist, Moore certainly needs an account of how it becomes the case that it is
permissible to harm someone because she deserves it. Either our rights are specified such that they are
not infringed when we are given deserved punishment,56 or we forfeit our rights in such cases.57 Indeed,
Moore allows of such a possibility, noting that we can punish offenders because no non-forfeited right
stands in the state’s way, “since [offenders] forfeit such rights precisely by the culpable wrongdoing that
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constitute desert.”58 If Moore does not deny that defendants may be permissibly punished—that is
harmed without their rights standing in the punisher’s way—then why does he deny that rights may
shift in self-defense cases?59
Finally, one wonders whether Moore implicitly brings to bear the very same moral facts, just in a
different package. If self-defense is about distributing harm, there is a reason why the bad guy gets that
harm and the good guy does not.60 That reason, that alteration in moral standing vis-à-vis others, looks
quite like what liability theorists are after. Perhaps Moore has good arguments for why these accounts
are importantly different. I wish he would tell us what those are.
VI.

A Deterrence Theorist After All?

To this point I have offered concerns about Moore’s commitments within self-defense theory,
but if Moore is right, I wonder whether his theory of self-defense leads to a very different justification
for punishment. Notably, I share with Moore a commitment to retributivism. I just wonder whether he
is actually a back door deterrence theorist. Here is how the argument runs.
The concern with deterrence theories of punishment is that they countenance punishing the
innocent, and in particular, using the innocent as a means. A pure utilitarian theory would allow good
consequences to justify scapegoating someone wholly unconnected with the crime.61 Because
utilitarian theories condone the punishment of the undeserving, and because mixed theories seem to
exempt the punishment of the deserving where no further good is accomplished, Moore declares that
the last theory standing is retributivism. This is what he calls retributivism by the back door.62
The question, though, is whether Moore’s commitments to a distributive justice view of selfdefense can go some distance toward establishing a distinct justification for punishment. Maybe there
is more than one back door to the house.
Notice that the first chink in the armor, as Victor Tadros has shown, is that the prohibition on
punishing, or using, the innocent, requires a deontological account of why harming this particular
person is not using him.63 Retributivism furnishes such a reason, but Tadros has argued that if the
wrongdoer has a duty to suffer then he is not being used. If I push you into the lake, I have a duty to
rescue you. If Alex points a gun at me to enforce that duty, he is not using me as I am already required
to rescue you from drowning. The duty provides all the justification we need for why I am not being
used as a means when Alex forces me to save you. Now, one need not agree with Tadros about his duty
58
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view for the criminal law (I doubt Moore does, and I don’t) to see the force of the argument, which is
that a deontological account need not be a retributive account. One just needs an account of why the
person does not have a right that stands in the way.
Now consider Moore’s commitments to self-defense as a form of distributive justice. If one is
culpable in forcing a choice, then one ought to be the one to suffer the harm. The culpable cause of the
peril is the person who should suffer the harm. Here, too, we have a deontological account of when it is
permissible to harm others.
In reaching this theory, Moore endorses Philip Montague’s work. Let us consider another
Montague fan. Daniel Farrell also endorses Montague’s views, but for an entirely different end. He
employs Montague’s theory to justify specific and general deterrence.64
Farrell’s brief for specific deterrence is a rather clear case. If someone hurts you, and by virtue
of that attack, she makes it more likely that you will not be able to resist subsequent attacks from her,
then she is the culpable cause of your peril. If harming her abates these potential injuries, then on
Montague’s theory, claims Farrell, one is justified in harming the attacker.65
Consider also his claim for general deterrence. “[S]omeone might attack me, in the state of
nature, and someone else, observing this attack, and observing as well that it goes unpunished, might be
inspired by what she sees to attack me subsequently herself, even though she would not have dared to
do this if my original attacker had been punished for his attack.”66 Now, admittedly, there are some
steps required to get from this point to a system of general deterrence. Farrell endorses the view that
one is harmed when one is faced with an “increased probability of being harmed sometime in the
future.”67 Moore would never go for that. He does not take risks to be harms. Still, Moore cannot avoid
the point that given his endorsement of Montague’s theory, on self-defense and defense of others
grounds, we may be justified in harming someone if he makes an attack by others inevitable.
It may be that such a theory is too convoluted for application in the real world. It may simply be
impossible to determine how much harm may be visited on a defendant for the peril he creates in the
future.68 Perhaps, via this reasoning, deterrence may be theoretically justified but not practically
implemented.
Still, I am somewhat curious what would happen in the (nearby?) possible world where Moore
pursues these questions with the same sort of ruthless resolve with which he has subjected action
theory or causal metaphysics. Would Moore endorse the position that his distributive justice
commitments yield an entirely different justification for punishment?
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Indeed, consider what the content of our criminal law would look like if Moore took his theory
of self-defense and maintained his view that it applies to innocent threats. Consider cases of
nondeserving actors in the retributive sense. Sometimes utilitarian arguments are made that an excuse
should not be recognized because recognition will open up the floodgates to abuse by others. Mistake
of law, duress, and insanity are classic instances where such a claim arises. This sort of argument is
antithetical to retributivism, but it isn’t to Moore’s distributive justice account of self-defense. If your
innocent mistake makes me vulnerable to ploys by nonmistaken actors, you have made me worse off,
and thus, you ought to be the one to suffer the harm. Punishment of the (morally) innocent is justified
after all. I suppose that in Moore’s book, they just own that risk they’ve done nothing to deserve.
Conclusion
Michael Moore does not just engage topics. He conquers them. I have learned more from him than any
other theorist. I am grateful to have had him as a teacher. I am grateful to call him my friend. But most
importantly, I am grateful that such a brilliant mind has done such tremendous work in a field I love, and
that I get to engage with his ideas. Now, Michael, please come and conquer self-defense.
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